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Abstract	
The	so‐called	self‐defense	forces	in	Mexico	must	be	seen	as	a	form	of	vigilantism	generated	
by	 an	 incipient	 process	 of	 democratization	 that	 has	 not	 produced	 the	 institutional	 quality	
necessary	 to	 contain	 the	activity	of	organized	crime	groups	driven,	 essentially,	 by	 the	high	
demand	 for	drugs	 in	 the	United	 States.	Our	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	Mexico’s	Tierra	Caliente	
(‘Hotlands’)	 revealed	 profound	 processes	 of	 institutional	 deterioration	 in	 politics	 and	 the	
economy	 that	 have	 created	 conditions	 ripe	 for	 vigilantism.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 substantial	
improvements	 in	 the	 quality	 of	 Mexico’s	 democracy,	 especially	 at	 the	 levels	 of	 state	 and	
municipal	government,	the	emergence	of	other	forms	of	vigilantism	and	ongoing	violence	are	
foreseeable.	
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Introduction	 	
The	objective	of	this	work	is	to	analyze	the	so‐called	self‐defense	forces	that	have	formed	in	the	
Tierra	 Caliente	 region	 of	 the	 state	 of	 Michoacán.1	 They	 are	 conceptualized	 as	 a	 form	 of	
vigilantism	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 development	 processes	 of	 democratic	 systems	
still	marked	by	inefficiency.	We	posit	that,	unlike	cases	of	vigilantism	that	have	arisen	in	other	
areas	 of	 the	 world	 (Newby	 2012;	 Silke	 2001),	 in	 Mexico	 these	 movements	 were	 born	 as	 a	
defensive	 reaction	by	 local	 communities	 seeking	 to	protect	 themselves	 from	criminal	 activity,	
given	the	absence	of	the	rule	of	law	or	a	government	capable	of	guaranteeing	even	the	minimal	
conditions	of	existence	for	its	citizens.	
	
The	 study	 adopts	 a	 qualitative	 perspective	 to	 analyze	 the	 evolution	 of	 self‐defense	 forces	 in	
Tierra	Caliente	from	their	formation	in	2014	to	the	present.	This	focus	is	based	on	documentary	
sources,	in‐depth	interviews	with	key	actors	in	the	region,	and	the	authors’	own	experiences	in	
the	area.	Data‐gathering	began	in	2011	with	a	series	of	research	projects	on	topics	related	to	the	
issue	of	organized	crime.	
	
The	formation	of	self‐defense	forces	in	Michoacán	arose	in	the	context	of	the	strategy	to	combat	
drug‐trafficking	implemented	by	the	Mexican	government	in	2007	under	then‐President	Felipe	
Calderón.	The	thrust	of	that	program	was	to	attack	the	largest	criminal	groups	by	capturing	or	
killing	 their	 leaders,	 in	 the	 belief	 that	 this	 would	 fragment	 the	 structures	 of	 organized	
delinquency.	But	 the	 result	of	 this	 strategy	has	been	what	we	call	 the	 ‘Balkanization’	of	 those	
groups	in	that	it	has	been	marked	by	bloody	internecine	wars	of	succession	that	have	generated	
most	of	the	over	107,000	victims	of	violence	since	2007	(Secretariado	del	Sistema	Nacional	de	
Seguridad	 Pública	 2015),	 disparagement	 of	 the	 country	 on	 the	 world	 stage,	 and	 a	 severe	
curtailment	of	private	 investment,	while	having	virtually	no	effect	on	 levels	of	drug	use	 in	the	
US.	
	
Perhaps	one	positive	secondary	effect	of	Calderón’s	war	on	drugs	and	the	 levels	of	violence	 it	
has	 produced	 is	 that	 it	 has	 stimulated	 broad	 discussions	 of	 the	 relations	 among	 democratic	
development,	 drug‐trafficking,	 and	 violence	 in	 the	 country.	 But	 little	 argumentation	 has	
conceptualized	the	problem	of	violence	in	Mexico	from	a	perspective	that	emphasizes	the	need	
to	consolidate	democratic	development,	 for	most	analyses	 focus	on	police‐	and	military‐based	
approaches	to	the	drug	problem.	
	
The	formation	of	self‐defense	forces	–	a	form	of	vigilantism	–	in	the	state	of	Michoacán	offers	a	
valuable	 perspective	 on	 how	 the	 process	 of	 democratic	 development	 in	 Mexico	 could	 be	 re‐
channeled	 through	movements	with	 a	 social	 base.	 Thus,	 this	 study	 analyzes	 the	 formation	 of	
these	militarized	groups	 from	the	perspective	of	democratic	development,	describing	specific,	
singular	 features	 of	 vigilantism	 in	 Michoacán,	 including	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 a	 transnational	
phenomenon,	 and	 that	 it	 seeks	 to	 socially	 vindicate	 public	 security	 as	 a	 fundamental	 right	 of	
citizens.	Finally,	it	presents	a	series	of	suggestions	for	public	policies	directed	to	governments	in	
Mexico	and	the	US,	since	the	latter	is	an	important	actor	in	the	dynamics	of	self‐defense	forces	in	
Mexico.		
	
Vigilantism	 in	 Mexico	 emerged	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 immature	 democracy	 with	 formal	
institutions	that	are	not	yet	capable	of	providing	its	citizens	with	even	the	most	basic	conditions	
of	 life,	especially	 in	 the	area	of	public	safety.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	a	phenomenon	clearly	associated	
with	the	democratic	process	and	its	consolidation,	and	not	so	much	with	the	demand	for	drugs	
in	the	US	According	to	Johnston	(1996),	vigilantism	is	characterized	by	the	following:	
	
(i) It	involves	planning	and	premeditation	by	those	who	engage	in	it.	
(ii) Participants	are	private	citizens	whose	engagement	is	voluntary.	
(iii) It	is	a	form	of	‘autonomous	citizenship’	and,	as	such,	constitutes	a	social	movement.	
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(iv) It	uses,	or	threatens	to	use,	force.		
(v) It	arises	when	an	established	order	is	under	threat	from	the	transgression,	or	potential	
or	imputed	transgression,	of	institutionalized	norms.		
(vi) It	aims	to	control	crime	or	other	social	infractions	by	offering	assurances	(‘guarantees’)	
of	security	to	participants	and	others.	
Several	 studies	 have	 examined	 the	 topic	 of	 self‐defense	 forces	 in	 Michoacán	 (Guerra	 Manzo	
2015;	 Hale	 2014;	 Hoopes	 2015),	 but	most	 analyze	 only	 the	 historical	 context	 of	 these	 forces	
while	 emphasizing	 the	 presence	 of	 informal	 institutions,	 the	 social	 tradition	 of	 forming	 self‐
defense	groups,	and	the	profound	weaknesses	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Mexico.	However,	there	are	
few	 analyses	 of	 the	 relation	 among	 the	 processes	 of	 democratic	 transition,	 institutional	
weakness,	and	the	formation	of	vigilantism	in	Mexico.		
	
The	 central	 hypothesis	 of	 this	 article	 is	 that	 vigilantes	 will	 not	 disappear	 from	 the	 Mexican	
landscape	until	a	process	of	democratic	consolidation	is	implemented	that	imposes	at	least	the	
minimal	 conditions	 for	 the	 effective	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 quality	 of	 Mexico’s	 democracy	 can	 be	
improved	in	the	medium‐term	by	the	social	pressure	that	groups	of	citizens	like	these	vigilantes	
in	Michoacán	can	exert.	
	
The	democratic	context		
The	phenomenon	of	vigilantism	tends	to	 increase	 in	countries	 that	have	only	recently	opened	
their	doors	to	democracy	(Pratten	2008).	And	this	is	applicable	to	the	case	of	Michoacán,	one	of	
the	 states	 in	Mexico	 that	witnessed	 great	 vitality	 and	 exerted	 considerable	 political	 pressure	
that,	in	the	late	twentieth	century,	contributed	significantly	to	the	process	of	democratic	reform.	
One	might	say	that	Mexico	formally	achieved	democracy	in	the	year	2000	with	the	election	of	a	
President	 who	 was	 not	 from	 the	 Institutional	 Revolutionary	 Party	 (Partido	 Revolucionario	
Institutional	 or	 PRI)	 that	 had	 governed	Mexico	 for	 over	 60	 years,	 usually	 the	 only	 party	 that	
postulated	 candidates	 for	 such	 offices	 as	 mayor	 (presidente	 municipal),	 state	 congressman	
(diputado	local),	congressman	(diputado	federal),	senator	(senador),	governor	(gobernador)	and,	
of	course,	the	Presidency	of	the	Republic.	For	over	50	years,	the	PRI	never	lost	an	election	while	
transforming	 itself	 into	 the	 party	 of	 a	 state	 governed	 by	 a	 President	who	 exercised	 absolute	
power	over	 the	 country’s	destiny	during	his	 six‐year	 term	of	 office.	An	 apt	 comparison	 could	
well	be	the	Communist	Parties	of	Eastern	Europe	during	the	period	of	the	Cold	War.	
	
Throughout	the	decades	of	PRI	domination,	the	President	controlled	every	aspect	of	the	nation’s	
political	 life,	constituting	a	kind	of	six‐year	Caesar	endowed	with	total	political	authority.	This	
arrangement	proved	efficient	 in	Mexico	as	 it	ensured	the	political	stability	 that	contributed	to	
the	 nation’s	 economic	 development	 and	 wellbeing.	 However,	 by	 the	 late	 twentieth	 century,	
Mexico’s	presidential	political	system	began	to	show	cracks	with	the	emergence	of	new	political	
actors	committed	to	the	struggle	 for	greater	democratic	development,	and	to	the	 failure	of	an	
inefficient	 economic	 model	 based	 on	 state	 control	 of	 the	 economy.	 The	 PRI’s	 longstanding	
dominance	 over	 political	 life	 came	 to	 an	 abrupt	 end	 in	 2000,	 when	 the	 candidate	 from	 the	
National	Action	Party	(Partido	Acción	Nacional	or	PAN)	won	the	presidency.	
	
At	 the	 national	 level,	 significant	 changes	 in	 the	 democratic	 process	 in	 Mexico	 began	 in	 the	
1990s.	These	included	the	creation	of	an	autonomous	electoral	organ,	more	equitable	electoral	
legislation,	and	greater	independence	of	judicial	electoral	authorities.	This	period	also	saw	the	
empowerment	 of	 actors	 who	 sought	 to	 balance	 power,	 including	 the	 press	 and	 groups	 of	
intellectuals.	 However,	 changes	 such	 as	 these	 impacted	 primarily	 at	 the	 federal	 government	
level,	and	were	concentrated	in	the	central	region	of	the	country.		
	
The	arrival	of	a	President	from	a	party	other	than	the	PRI	did	little	to	improve	the	democratic	
quality	of	 state	governments.	 Indeed,	 the	 reality	of	 state	and	 local	governments	 is	exactly	 the	
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same	as	that	which	existed	during	the	period	of	PRI	domination,	with	the	important	caveat	that	
there	is	now	no	central	power	capable	of	reining	in	the	states.	As	a	result,	governors	began	to	
see	themselves	as	‘emperors’	of	their	states	during	their	six	years	in	power.	On	a	much	smaller	
scale,	 the	 same	 can	 be	 said	 of	 many	 mayors	 (presidentes	 municipales)	 who	 ran	 their	
governments	like	small	kingdoms	during	their	three	years	of	service.	
	
The	forces	that	propelled	democratic	change	at	the	national	level	in	Mexico	could	not,	however,	
operate	at	the	level	of	state	or	municipal	government.	State	governments	continued	to	be	deeply	
corrupt	with	 little	 transparency	 in	 their	 actions,	 operating	with	no	 effective	 system	of	 checks	
and	balances	as	independent	local	congresses.	From	2000	to	the	present,	Mexico	has	witnessed	
innumerable	 cases	 of	 governors	 accused	 and	 brought	 to	 trial	 for	 flagrantly	 corrupt	 practices,	
and	the	same	has	occurred	at	the	municipal	level.	
	
Analytically,	democratic	development	of	state	governments	 in	Mexico	can	be	examined	on	the	
basis	of	three	fundamental	indicators.	The	first	is	the	absence	of	a	balance	of	power.	Generally‐
speaking,	governors	in	Mexico	control	state	congresses	by	dominating	political	parties	through	
vast	 expenditures	 of	 public	 resources.	 Because	 Mexico	 does	 not	 permit	 the	 re‐election	 of	
governors	or	 local	 congressmen,	 these	popular	 representatives	generally	devote	 their	 time	 in	
office	to	personal	enrichment.	For	local	congressmen,	in	particular,	the	fundamental	priority	is	
to	amass	personal	fortunes	during	their	three‐year	term	in	government	that	will	guarantee	their	
families’	economic	wellbeing	for	 life.	The	nominal	 income	of	 these	elected	officials	 is	12	times	
greater	than	the	Gross	Domestic	Product	per	capita	of	Mexicans,	the	highest	proportion	of	any	
country	in	the	OCDE	(Ameth	2015).	
	
As	a	result,	the	scenario	is	plagued	by	political	clientelism	where,	in	exchange	for	ratifying	the	
proposed	 legislation,	outlays	of	 funds,	public	budgets,	 and	so	on,	 that	governors	send	 to	 their	
state	 legislatures,	 representatives	 receive	 substantial	 resources	 from	 both	 the	 governors	
themselves	and	public	funds	that	they	adjudicate	for	themselves.		
	
And	 citizens?	 Well,	 they	 are	 simple	 spectators	 of	 these	 processes	 since	 they	 cannot	 punish	
governors	 and	 representatives	 by,	 for	 example,	 voting	 them	 out	 of	 office,	 since	 re‐election	 is	
prohibited	 by	 law.	 Term	 after	 term,	 citizens	 can	 only	 look	 on	 as	 the	 carnival	 of	 corruption	
among	governors	and	local	representatives	plays	out	before	them.	These	conditions,	including	
corruption	scandals,	 of	 course,	wrest	all	 legitimacy	and	authority	 from	 these	 supposed	public	
servants	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 citizens,	 while	 informal	 arrangements	 grant	 complete	 authority	 and	
power	to	the	governor,	who	wields	 it	vertically	–	that	 is,	 ‘top‐down’	rule	unhindered	by	many	
checks	 and	 balances	 –	 during	his	 six	 years	 in	 office,	 virtually	 free	 of	 any	 kind	of	 institutional	
counterweight.		
	
In	 most	 cases,	 the	 governor	 is	 from	 the	 party	 that	 holds	 a	 majority	 in	 the	 House	 of	
Representatives,	 so	he	 is	 even	 freer	 to	 control	 the	 representatives	 (equivalent	 to	members	of	
Parliament).	 In	 the	 few	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 governor’s	 party	 does	 not	 enjoy	 a	 majority,	 he	
exercises	power	and	control	by	buying	off	 the	political	 loyalties	of	representatives	 from	other	
parties.		
	
The	 press,	 a	 fundamental	 element	 in	 processes	 of	 democratic	 development	 (Ranjan	 and	
Kashyap	 2014),	 is	 practically	 in	 the	 pockets	 of	 state	 governments.	 The	 survival	 of	 the	 print,	
digital	 and	 electronic	 media	 depends	 fundamentally	 on	 payouts	 received	 from	 state	
governments,	 such	 that	 when	 this	 source	 of	 largesse	 is	 denied,	 they	 are	 basically	 unable	 to	
perform	their	journalistic	work.	In	short,	they	are	almost	completely	dependent	on	government.	
	
The	second	element	has	to	do	with	the	absence	of	formal	mechanisms	for	sanctioning	corrupt	or	
inefficient	governors.	The	judicial	vigilance	of	governors	could	only	emanate	from	an	efficacious	
judicial	power	capable	of	establishing	conditions	of	harmonious	co‐existence.	But	in	most	states	
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in	Mexico	judicial	power	is	also	controlled	by	the	governor	who	exerts	great	political	pressure	
over	such	processes	as	appointing	the	President	of	the	Supreme	Court,	magistrates,	and	judges	
at	the	state	level.	
	
The	 politicization	 of	 justice	 reached	 its	 apogee	 during	 the	 long	 epoch	 of	 Mexico’s	 ‘Imperial	
Presidency’,	 as	 presidents	 gave	 direct	 orders	 to	 judges	 and	 tribunals	 of	 justice	 regarding	 the	
sentences	they	were	to	impose.	This	did	not	occur	in	all	judicial	litigation;	rather,	in	those	cases	
in	which	the	president	or	some	member	of	his	political	team	had	a	special	interest	in	‘guiding’	a	
judicial	decision	(Yamin	and	Garcia	1999).	
	
The	 subordination	 of	 judicial	 power	 to	 the	 executive	 branch	 generated	 deep	 mistrust	 and	
delegitimized	the	juridical	actions	performed	by	courts.	To	make	matters	worse,	the	absence	of	
mechanisms	 of	 internal	 control	within	 the	 judicial	 power	 produced	 scandalous	 corruption	 in	
most	apparatuses	of	 justice.	Money	or	political	 contacts	allowed	 individuals	 to	 resolve	almost	
any	 kind	 of	 legal	 impediment	 or	 sanction	 applicable	 to	 the	 crime	 committed.	 Obviously,	 this	
meant	 that	 judicial	 power	 could	 not	 perform	 its	 role	 as	 the	 constitutional	 counterweight	 to	
executive	power,	a	situation	that	was	reproduced	at	the	state	level,	as	in	Michoacán,	where	the	
subordination	of	judicial	power	to	executive	power	was	even	more	intense.	
	
It	was	 in	this	context	that	the	PRI’s	 failure	to	secure	the	presidency	 in	2000	and	maintain	the	
six‐year	 presidential	 tyranny	 left	 governors	 virtually	 free	 to	 continue	 exercising	 their	 role	 as	
emperors	 of	 their	 states	 during	 their	 six	 years	 in	 government.	 The	 functions	 of	 presenting	
evidence	 to	 the	 courts	 and	 prosecuting	 suspects	 are	 performed	 by	 state	 prosecutors	 named	
directly	by	the	governor,	who	in	this	way	guaranteed	full	support	from,	and	control	over,	both	
the	administration	of	justice	and	the	tribunals	themselves.	
	
The	 third	 element	 concerns	 the	 development	 over	 several	 years	 of	 a	 political	 culture	 among	
Mexican	 citizens	 based	 on	 clientelistic	 and	 paternalistic	 relations,	 not	 on	 a	 growing	
consciousness	of	citizen	responsibility.	From	childhood,	Mexicans	of	all	generations	have	been	
educated	 in	 a	 culture	 in	 which	 the	 government	 fulfills	 its	 obligations	 and	 responsibility	 to	
citizens	 simply	 by	 delivering	 resources	 and	 services	 in	 exchange	 for	 their	 votes.	 People	
generally	 do	 not	 receive	 an	 education	 that	 stimulates	 consciousness	 of	 solidarity	 with	 the	
society	as	a	whole;	nor	is	there	a	culture	of	accountability	and	transparency	among	politicians	
or	 citizens.	 Consciousness	 of	 ‘the	 society	 as	 a	 whole’	 is	 almost	 non‐existent	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
importance	for	respect	for	law	and	formally	established	norms.	
	
For	 many	 years,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 single	 political	 party	 in	 Mexico	 generated	 clientelistic	
relations	with	citizens	 that	 led	 to	 the	perverse	consolidation	of	a	 culture	of	 ‘let	 it	go,	 let	 it	be’	
among	citizens,	as	long	as	some	kind	of	financial	compensation	or	public	service	was	received	in	
exchange	(Brinkerhoff	and	Goldsmith	2002;	Hernández	Muñoz	2006).	But	this	‘contract’	expired	
during	 the	 financial	 crises	 of	 the	 1980s	 that	 left	 the	 government	 bereft	 of	 the	 monetary	
resources	necessary	to	hold	up	its	end	of	the	bargain	in	existing	social	contracts.	
	
At	 the	 level	 of	 state	 governments,	 the	 effect	 was	 even	 more	marked	 since	 governors’	 closer	
contact	with	citizens	 facilitated	the	establishment	of	more	 intimate	clientelistic	relations.	As	a	
result,	public	 infrastructure	projects,	 employment	opportunities	 in	government,	 authorization	
of	credits,	and	other	sundry	supports	that	the	government	could	dispense	were	allotted	on	the	
basis	of	these	relations.		
	
Additional	complications	 included	the	grim	realities	of	a	social	order	 in	which	the	educational	
levels	of	the	general	population	are	 low.	In	Mexico	as	a	whole,	mean	years	of	schooling	is	 just	
nine,	but	in	Michoacán	this	falls	to	7.9	years	(INEGI	2015).	Of	course,	where	people	are	poorly‐
educated,	 it	 is	easier	 to	maintain	clientelistic	schemes	of	political	control	based	on	disbursing	
resources	 (Abdulai	 and	Hickey	 2016;	 Berinsky	 and	 Lenz	 2010).	 The	 vast	majority	 of	 citizens	
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consider	 that	structures	of	mutual	patronage	between	governors	and	 the	governed	 is	 in	 their	
best	interest,	even	though	they	are	outside	the	legal	framework.		
	
The	case	of	Michoacán	and	self‐defense	forces	
The	 state	 of	 Michoacán	 well	 reflects	 these	 conditions	 of	 democratic	 underdevelopment	 in	
Mexico,	where	the	governor’s	virtually	personal	power,	 the	absence	of	checks	and	balances	 in	
the	 political	 sphere,	 the	 control	 of	 judicial	 power,	 and	 omnipresent	 clientelistic	 practices	
configure	political	life.	Moreover,	Michoacán	is	the	geographic	region	where	the	most	important	
political	 changes	 have	 occurred.	 For	 example,	 in	 1988	 it	 witnessed	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 National	
Democratic	 Front	 (Frente	 Democrático	 Nacional),	 the	 political	 movement	 that	 propelled	 the	
electoral	changes	of	1997	which	sanctioned	the	existence	of	a	legal	framework	that	made	free	
electoral	 competition	 possible	 and	 that	 created	 the	 conditions	 which	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	
election	 of	 a	 President	 from	 a	 different	 party	 in	 the	 year	 2000	 and	 of	 a	 non‐PRI	 governor	 in	
2002.	
	
But	this	role	as	protagonist	of	political	change	at	the	national	 level	generated	instability	and	a	
vacuum	of	political	 leadership	in	the	state.	From	1988	to	2015,	Michoacán	had	more	 than	ten	
different	governors	when	there	should	have	been	only	four!	During	the	dominion	of	the	PRI,	the	
existence	 of	 a	 strong	 central	 power	 embodied	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 a	 President	 who	 delegated	
authority	 to	 the	 state	 governors	 ensured	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 power	 that,	 when	 anarchy	
threatened,	could	swiftly	and	efficiently	 impose	order.	But	 the	aforementioned	end‐of‐century	
democratic	 changes	 fractured	 this	 scheme	 and	 left	 the	 state	 government	 of	 Michoacán	
profoundly	 weakened,	 as	 a	 void	 of	 authority	 allowed	 political	 groups,	 which	 had	 long	 been	
controlled,	 to	 exercise	 power	 and	 fulfill	 their	 aspirations.	 Exemplary	 cases	 include	 labor	
movements,	especially	the	powerful	teachers’	union,	and	organized	crime	groups.	
	
In	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 Tierra	 Caliente	 was	 characterized	 by	 the	
presence	 of	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 cacique,	 a	 kind	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 ‘boss’	 who	 literally	
controlled	people’s	lives	and	livelihoods	(Karst	and	Rosenn	1975).	This	political	figure	was	the	
primary	referent	power	and	authority	there.	Later,	the	diverse	changes	in	the	relation	between	
government	and	citizen	molded,	 in	 this	zone,	clientelistic	political	arrangements	that	 followed	
the	model	implemented	by	the	PRI	throughout	Mexico.	Municipalities	in	the	region	have	never	
known	 conditions	 approaching	 those	 of	 democratic	 normality	 in	 terms	 of	 such	 indicators	 as	
political	participation,	the	quality	of	local	institutions,	freedom	of	the	press,	and	participation	by	
civil	society.		
	
For	years,	and	still	today,	Tierra	Caliente	has	been	entangled	in	political	problems	derived	from	
land	 tenure,	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	 public	 policies,	 geographic	 isolation,	 inequitable	 models	 of	
local	economic	development,	and	a	woefully	inefficient	educational	system	(Maldonado	2010).	
It	 is	 an	 area	 where	 a	 plethora	 of	 social	 programs	 and	 government	 initiatives	 have	 been	
implemented,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 which	 proved	 completely	 fruitless,	 serving	 only	 to	
consolidate	 the	personal	 fortunes	of	politicians	and	 local	public	officials.	 For	decades,	deeply‐
rooted	 corruption	 and	 the	 use	 of	 public	 administration	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 paying	 political	
favors	 (Amparán	 2000)	 have	 generated	 a	 governing	 apparatus	 that	 is	 terribly	 inefficient	 in	
terms	of	administration	and	the	operation	of	public	policies	(Lehouq	et	al.	2005).		
	
This	 region	 also	 exemplifies	 the	 existence	 of	 phenomena	 of	micro‐corruption,	 as	 virtually	 all	
structures	 of	 government	 entrusted	 with	 applying	 public	 policies	 and	 performing	
administrative	 functions	 are	 inefficient	 and	 poorly‐organized.	 Bureaucracies	 are	 rife	 with	
corruption	and	no	mechanisms	of	any	kind	exist	that	might	allow	ordinary	citizens	to	sanction	
this	inoperability	and	inadequate	realization	of	most	government	programs.	This	is	particularly	
applicable	 in	 the	 case	 of	 education,	 where	 the	 presence	 of	 powerful	 teachers’	 unions	 and	
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collusion	 between	 authorities	 and	 teachers	 has	 established	 clientelistic	 relations	 in	 which	
political	activity	takes	clear	precedence	over	teaching.	
	
Thousands	of	millions	of	pesos	of	social	budgets	have	been	invested	in	Tierra	Caliente	with	no	
perceptible	effect	 in	terms	of	 improving	the	population’s	 living	conditions.	 It	 is	not	difficult	to	
understand	the	emergence	of	criminal	groups	in	a	social	milieu	in	which	the	state	lacks	a	strong,	
formal	presence,	where	 the	 rule	 of	 law	does	not	 exist,	 and	where	opportunities	 for	 economic	
development	are	nil	for	most	inhabitants.	
	
Up	 to	 the	 year	 2007,	 diverse	 delinquent	 groups	 operated	 in	 this	 zone,	 but	 they	were	mostly	
small	bands	of	drug‐traffickers	that	produced	marihuana	and	heroin	destined,	primarily,	for	US	
markets.	 But	 later	 these	 groups	began	 to	merge	with	 the	major	 criminal	 cartels	 in	Mexico	 to	
commercialize	 their	products	and	aid	 in	 the	 logistics	of	 transporting	 them	 to	 the	US.	 In	 those	
years,	 these	 criminal	 groups	 in	Michoacán	 did	 not	 intervene	 in	 the	 political	 life	 of	 their	 sub‐
regions;	nor	were	 they	 involved	 in	 the	commission	of	 such	crimes	as	kidnappings,	murder	or	
extortion.	Local	populations	were	aware	of	the	existence	of	what	they	called	marihuaneros,	but	
left	them	free	to	go	about	their	business	as	long	as	they	did	not	interfere	in	the	daily	life	of	their	
communities.	
	
In	 2007,	Mexico’s	 federal	 government	 introduced	 a	 drastic	 change	 in	 its	 strategy	 for	 dealing	
with	 drug‐trafficking	 as	 it	 implemented	 a	 policy	 based	 on	 capturing	 –	 or	 simply	 killing	 –	 the	
principal	leaders	of	the	drug	cartels.	The	first	effect	of	this	onslaught	was	to	fracture	the	existing	
balance	in	narcotics	markets	by	triggering	internecine	wars	inside	the	cartels	over	positions	of	
leadership	and	control	of	transportation	routes	to	the	US	(Ríos	2013).	A	second	impact	was	that	
members	 of	 the	 bands	 disarticulated	 by	 police/government/military	 action	 simply	 coalesced	
into	 new	 gangs	 and	 groups	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 traditional	 leadership	 established	 by	
criminal	 groups	 in	 past	 decades	 that	 had	 maintained	 policies	 of	 non‐violence	 and	 rejected	
involvement	in	other	common	forms	of	criminal	activity.		
	
One	consequence	of	this	new	policy	for	the	drug	cartels	in	Michoacán,	principally	the	Caballeros	
Templarios	 (‘Templar	 Knights’),	 was	 that	 they	 lost	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 large	 criminal	
cartels	in	Mexico	that	had	provided	them	with	the	logistics	necessary	to	reach	drug	markets	in	
the	US.	Their	 response,	 logically,	was	 to	 look	 for	ways	 to	 accede	 those	markets	 on	 their	 own	
account.	One	strategy	they	adopted	was	to	introduce	synthetic	drugs.		
	
Another	approach	was	for	delinquent	groups	in	the	state,	taking	advantage	of	the	existing,	solid	
criminal	 structure,	 to	 adopt	 a	 ‘business	 model’	 that	 emphasized	 extracting	 ‘rents’	 from	 civil	
society.	Suddenly,	small	merchants,	cattle‐ranchers,	 farmers	and	professional	people	all	 found	
themselves	targets	of	extortion	by	criminal	groups	that	demanded	weekly	payments	(protection	
money)	in	exchange	for	allowing	them	to	carry	on	their	daily	affairs.	In	return,	those	criminals	
offered	to	protect	 the	 inhabitants	 from	interventions	by	other	delinquent	groups.	To	 this	end,	
the	 main	 criminal	 group	 even	 elaborated	 a	 ‘Declaration	 of	 Principles’,	 which	 established	 its	
obligation	to	‘protect’	the	population	and	to	respect	a	series	of	norms	of	conduct	that	reflected	
positive	moral	 values,	 though	 it	 simultaneously	 intensified	 their	penetration	 into	 the	political	
life	of	the	state.	
	
By	 the	year	2007,	collusion	among	 the	governor,	 local	and	 federal	representatives,	 senators	–	
indeed	 the	 entire	 local	 political	 class	 –	 and	 criminal	 groups,	 specifically	 the	 aforementioned	
Caballeros	 Templarios	 –	 the	 dominant	 cartel	 in	 Michoacán	 –	 was	 evident	 to	 all.	 Availing	
themselves	of	 the	absence	of	 the	 rule	of	 law,	drug‐traffickers	emerged	as	 ‘legitimate’	political	
actors	 who	 financed	 electoral	 campaigns,	 mediated	 conflicts	 between	 private	 citizens,	 fixed	
prices	 for	 agricultural	 products,	 and	 provided	 the	 services	 of	 Notary	 Publics,	 among	 sundry	
other	activities.		
	
Jerjes	Aguirre	Ochoa,	Casimiro	Leco	Tomas:	Democracy	and	Vigilantism:	The	Case	of	Michoacán,	Mexico	
IJCJ&SD								24	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2016	5(4)	
As	time	went	on	and	as	criminal	groups	extended	their	control	to	practically	every	aspect	of	the	
life	of	local	populations,	the	situation	in	Tierra	Caliente	became	increasingly	chaotic.	In	the	face	
of	the	weakness	and	deep	corruption	of	state	and	local	governments,	people	came	to	accept	the	
political	 offer	 of	 criminal	 groups	 to	 impose	 order	 and	 authority	 in	 every	 nook	 and	 cranny	 of	
social	 life	(Flanigan	2014).	Their	authority	was	exercised	through	local	 ‘chiefs’	(jefes	de	plaza)	
appointed	by	the	criminal	groups,	who	extorted	money	and	goods	from	citizens,	stole,	and	made	
kidnappings	and	murders	almost	daily	occurrences.		
	
It	was	in	this	context	that	the	self‐defense	forces	emerged	in	2013:	heterogeneous	groups	made	
up	 of	 small	 agricultural	 and	 service	 entrepreneurs,	 farmworkers,	 ordinary	 citizens,	 and	 even	
individuals	 linked	 to	 organized	 crime	 and	 delinquency.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 one	
forerunner	of	these	vigilantes	in	Tierra	Caliente	occurred	in	the	community	of	Cherán,	located	in	
the	indigenous	zone	of	the	state,	where	an	armed	Rural	Guard	had	existed	since	2011	with	the	
approval	and	support	of	community	members	(Tomas	2014).	
	
The	 self‐defense	 forces	 in	 Michoacán	 can	 best	 be	 conceived	 as	 informal	 social	 aggregations,	
continuing	a	long	history	of	informal	institutions	in	Mexico	(Molina	2008;	O’Donnell	1996)	that	
have	 guided	 political	 life.	 Due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 democratic	 system	 or	 governments	 with	
sufficient	 legitimacy	 to	 impose	 forms	 of	 social	 regulation	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 the	 self‐
defense	forces	should	be	seen	as	a	natural	defense	mechanism	of	society	to	protect	itself	from	
rampant	delinquency.	
	
These	 forces	soon	became	aware	of	 the	collusion	between	 the	 state	government	and	criminal	
groups.	 In	 a	 normal	 democracy,	 the	 implementation	 of	 checks	 and	 balances	 and	 legitimate	
forms	of	representation	would	lead	to	the	establishment	of	systems	of	defense	and	equilibriums	
that	 would	 make	 it	 unnecessary	 for	 the	 civil	 population	 to	 take	 up	 arms	 and	 confront	 the	
criminals	 in	 their	 midst.	 However,	 in	 Tierra	 Caliente	 local	 representatives	 are	 mere	 pawns	
subject	to	the	governor’s	interests	whose	future	political	careers	depend,	above	all,	on	‘loyalty’.	
There	is	no	evidence	that	these	representatives	have	ever	defended	the	interests	of	the	citizens	
that	 they	 supposedly	 represent.	 In	 fact,	 the	 evidence	 that	 does	 exist	 suggests	 exactly	 the	
opposite:	 collusion	 between	 local	 politicians	 and	 criminals	 (Michangoonga	 2014).	Worse	 yet,	
the	senator	of	the	Republic	for	this	region	lobbied	for	representatives	of	criminal	groups	to	be	
received	 in	 the	Senate	 chambers!	Amid	 the	absurdity	of	Mexican	democracy,	 the	 resources	of	
criminal	groups	far	outweighed	those	of	the	citizenry	(De	la	Rosa	2014).	
	
Another	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 these	 self‐defense	 forces	 is	 the	 broad	 participation	 of	migrants	
from	communities	in	Tierra	Caliente	residing	in	the	US,	 for	their	remittances	in	dollars	went	a	
long	way	towards	purchasing	firearms	and	otherwise	funding	these	groups.	Although	Mexican	
law	allows	migrants	and	michoacanos	living	in	the	US	to	vote,	the	number	of	ballots	cast	in	local	
elections	 has	 never	 surpassed	 500,	 out	 of	 a	 total	 pool	 of	 some	 two	 million	 potential	 voters	
(Garcia	 2015).	 Thus,	 the	 participation	 of	michoacanos	 residing	 in	 the	 US	 did	 not	materialize	
through	votes	cast	at	polling	stations	but,	rather,	through	their	response	to	a	concrete	situation;	
namely,	requests	for	support	issued	by	the	self‐defense	forces.	This	reflects,	once	again,	the	lack	
of	trust	in,	and	legitimacy	of,	democratic	mechanisms	in	relation	to	conflict	settlement,	as	well	
as	the	role	of	the	state	as	mediator	of	peaceful	social	co‐existence.	
	
In	2015,	Mexico’s	 federal	government	 sent	a	 ‘Commissioner’	 (Comisionado)	 to	Michoacán.	His	
mission	was	to	‘clean	up’	the	state	from	the	plague	of	organized	crime.	Wielding	the	Presidential	
power	invested	in	him,	the	Commissioner	forced	the	governor	and	his	entire	cabinet	to	resign.	
Sending	 such	 a	 Commissioner	 to	 a	 ‘Free	 and	 Sovereign	 State’	 –	 according	 to	 the	 terms	 of	
Mexico’s	Constitution	–	was	an	act	that	violated	all	laws	and	legal	norms.	Apparently,	the	meta‐
constitutional	faculties	of	the	President	and	the	threat	of	sending	the	governor	to	prison	sufficed	
to	 convince	 the	 latter	 to	 resign	 his	 post	 (Carpizo	 2006).	 Almost	 immediately,	 the	 local	 PRI	
representatives	who	held	a	majority	in	the	state	congress	were	compelled	to	appoint	an	interim	
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governor	who	could	do	nothing	more	than	follow	the	directives	of	the	Commissioner,	who	thus	
became	a	kind	of	Viceroy	of	Presidential	power.		
	
These	facts	have	strong	qualitative	implications	for	they	demonstrate	the	government’s	shallow	
interest	in	finding	concrete,	effective	solutions	to	the	problem	of	organized	crime	in	Michoacán,	
solutions	that	would	respect	 legal	channels	and	help	strengthen	the	quality	of	democracy,	 the	
rule	of	law,	and	government	institutions.	Instead,	the	government	chose	the	traditional	way	of	
Mexican	politics:	utilizing	informal	channels	to	resolve	problems.	
	
The	Commissioner	sent	by	the	 federal	government	 lent	a	 façade	of	 legality	 to	the	self‐defense	
forces	 by	 allowing	 them	 to	 operate.	 But	 from	 the	 outset	 the	 government’s	 aim	 was	 to	 take	
advantage	of	these	vigilantes	and	their	intimate	knowledge	of	the	terrain	to	locate	the	members	
of	 criminal	 groups,	 hunt	 them	 down,	 and	 imprison	 them.	 However,	 members	 of	 delinquent	
groups	opposed	to	the	dominant	cartel	had	already	infiltrated	the	self‐defense	forces,	seizing	a	
perceived	opportunity	to	gain	control	of	the	territory.	
	
Certainly,	the	year	2015	saw	the	capture	or	killing	of	the	principal	leaders	of	the	main	organized	
crime	 group	 in	 the	 state.	 However,	 vigilante	 activity	 continued	 there,	 forcing	 the	 federal	
government	to	later	capture	and	imprison	the	main	leaders	of	the	self‐defense	groups	as	well!	
	
As	of	2016,	several	self‐defense	forces	are	still	active	in	the	state	of	Michoacán,	and	outbreaks	of	
violence	 are	 common	 as	 these	 groups	 block	 highways,	 organize	 demonstrations,	 and	 burn	
vehicles	 to	 pressure	 the	 government	 to	 respond	 to	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 demands,	 from	urgently	
needed	public	works	to	freeing	their	jailed	leaders.		
	
Conclusions	
It	seems	that	the	phenomenon	of	vigilantism	has	come	to	stay	in	Michoacán.	The	explanation	of	
these	events	 lies	 in	 the	 lack	of	democracy	and	 the	 fragile	network	of	government	 institutions	
which	has	generated	a	situation	of	weakness	that	continues	to	produce	gaps	of	legitimacy	that	
both	 criminal	 groups	 and	 vigilante	 forces	 seem	 more	 than	 happy	 to	 attempt	 to	 fill.	 In	 the	
absence	of	the	democratic	reforms	required	to	generate	the	rule	of	law,	of	an	effective	judicial	
system,	and	a	system	of	checks	and	balances	in	the	Executive	branch,	there	is	no	way	that	the	
conditions	 and	 justification	 of	 vigilante	 activity	will	 disappear.	Without	 doubt,	 the	 conditions	
that	 explain	 the	 emergence	 of	 self‐defense	 forces	 in	 Mexico	 still	 persist	 today,	 especially	 in	
Michoacán.		
	
Recent	 years	have	seen	only	modest	democratic	 changes	 in	 the	 country.	The	President	of	 the	
Republic	 has	 not	 implemented	 an	 independent	 system	which	would	 ensure	 sanctions	 for	 the	
widespread	 corruption,	 that	 omnipresent	 and	 blatant	 scourge	 of	Mexico’s	 political	 class	 and,	
worse	still,	administrative	bureaucracies.	There	is	no	authority	independent	of	executive	power	
that	 could	 enforce	 limits	 on	 the	 sophisticated	 and	 systematic	 embezzlement	 of	 public	 funds	
practiced	by	the	political	class.		
	
The	vision	of	the	political	elite	that	governs	Mexico	has	always	been	oriented	towards	changing	
the	 country’s	 economic	 structure,	not	 its	 political	 structure.	 This	 has	marked	Mexico’s	 recent	
history	 since	 the	 time	 of	 President	 Salinas	 (Heine	 1996),	 with	 priority	 given	 to	 economic	
reforms	 that,	 in	 theory,	 improve	material	 conditions	 for	 the	 population	 and	 open	 the	way	 to	
modest	 political	 reforms	 that	 do	 not	 constitute	 an	 abrupt	 turn	 in	 political	 life	 in	 Mexico.	
However,	 recent	 economic	 reforms	 have	 not	 generated	 the	 anticipated	 results.	 Mexico’s	
economy	continues	to	grow	at	a	very	low	rate,	increasing	already	widespread	poverty	and	the	
miserable	 living	 conditions	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 population,	 with	 the	 notable	 exception	 of	
individuals	linked	to	politics	or	the	administration	of	public	resources	(The	Economist	2015).	
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In	 the	 short	 term,	 the	Mexican	political	 system	will	not	 generate	 the	mechanisms	 required	 to	
gain	 popular	 legitimacy	 and	 representativeness	 and	 so	 impede	 emergence	 of	 self‐defense	
groups	and	vigilantism	in	the	future.	In	fact,	vigilante	groups	now	operate	in	urban	areas	of	the	
state	 –	 having	 learned	 from	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 groups	 in	 Tierra	 Caliente	 –	 intent	 on	
preventing	common	criminality.	The	conditions	of	governmental	illegitimacy	and	weakness	are	
still	clearly	present.	To	make	matters	worse,	these	phenomena	of	illegitimacy	and	weakness	are	
reproduced	more	markedly	in	state	and	local	governments,	where	no	significant	changes	have	
occurred	 that	might	 improve	governance	and	citizens’	 acceptance	of	 their	governors.	Without	
such	 substantial	 changes	 at	 these	 levels	 of	 government,	 the	 future	 will	 be	 characterized	 by	
continuing	violence	and	irate	reactions	by	citizens	fed	up	with	the	lack	of	public	security.		
	
At	 the	 levels	 of	 state	 and	 local	 government,	 mechanisms	 need	 to	 be	 implemented	 that	 will	
ensure	accountability	to	the	citizenry,	prevent	the	emergence	of	a	‘pristine’	clientelistic	culture,	
and	 guarantee	 transparency	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 public	 resources.	 Moreover,	 the	
independence	of	the	judicial	system	must	be	cemented,	and	the	press	must	be	free	to	criticize,	
but	this	is	only	possible	if	it	is	no	longer	dependent	on	government	for	its	subsistence.	
	
Prospects	 for	 the	 medium	 term	 include	 the	 increasing	 delegitimation	 of	 government.	
Specifically,	it	is	likely	that	the	next	President	of	the	Republic	will	win	by	a	very	narrow	margin	
of	votes	in	a	hotly‐contested	election	involving	numerous	candidates.	The	absence	of	a	second	
round	 of	 voting	 or	 of	 some	 other	 mechanism	 capable	 of	 generating	 greater	 strength	 and	
legitimacy	 in	 government	 will	 mean	 that	 the	 next	 President	 will	 probably	 occupy	 that	 post	
having	received	less	than	30	per	cent	of	the	popular	vote	(Soto	2013).		
	
Improving	the	quality	of	democracy	and	establishing	the	rule	of	law	require	urgent	attention,	as	
these	are	the	only	effective	ways	of	putting	an	end	to	vigilantism	in	the	country.	Otherwise,	the	
Mexican	people	will	have	no	other	recourse	than	taking	the	law	into	their	own	hands	to	defend	
their	 integrity,	 thus	 usurping	one	 of	 the	 fundamental	 obligations	of	 the	 State	 in	 a	 democratic	
nation.	
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1	 The	 term	Tierra	Caliente	 alludes	 to	 the	 hot	 climate	 characteristic	 of	 this	 area	 of	Michoacán,	which	 includes	 the	
municipalities	of	Buenavista,	Parácuaro,	Tepalcatepec,	Aguililla	and	Apatzingán.	The	state	of	Michoacán	is	located	in	
West‐Central	Mexico	and	occupies	 three	per	 cent	of	 the	country's	 territory	with	58.599	square	kilometers	and	a	
population	of	approximately	four	million	inhabitants.	It	borders	on	the	Pacific	Coast	between	the	states	of	Guerrero	
to	the	south	(where	Acapulco	is	located)	and	Jalisco	to	the	north	(with	its	famed	tourist	resort,	Puerta	Vallarta).	It	is	
one	of	the	31	states	plus	the	Federal	District	(including	Mexico	City)	into	which	the	country	is	divided	politically.	
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